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THE ETHICS OF INVALID AND
"IFFY" CONTRACT CLAUSES
Christina L. Kunz*
This Symposium focuses on the extent to which attorneys can
use agreed terms to supplant or "bump" the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The articles in this Symposium
demonstrate that the degree to which attorneys customarily "contract
out"' varies considerably from UCC article to article. In reality,
though, the issues surrounding contracting out of UCC provisions are
not limited to the UCC, statutes, or other codified rules. The same
issues arise whenever an attorney
" discerns whether a rule of law is a mandatory or
default provision;
* drafts a clause on the edge of validity to try to gain an
advantage, while exposing the client to the risk that the
clause will not be valid;
* proposes a contractual clause that is invalid (whether
the lawyer knows it or not); or
* makes representations to the client or to the other party
or their counsel as to the current or prospective validity
of the clause.2
These issues are not new to transactional practice. Most "repeat
players" in the market periodically ask their lawyers to redraft their
standard-form contracts in ways that increasingly favor the drafter.
Some of these lawyers may intentionally draft clauses that are
. Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. The author
thanks her research assistants on this project, Jacob Sellers and Yoshitaka Nishikawa, who were
students at William Mitchell College of Law when they undertook this research. The author also
thanks her William Mitchell colleagues who reviewed this article-Professors Douglas
Heidenreich, Raleigh Hannah Levine, Nancy Ver Steegh, and Ann Juergens, as well as Professor
Irma Russell from the University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Under the UCC terminology, contracting out is really the process of agreeing otherwise
from the UCC's default provisions. See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part I (scenarios).
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already invalid, are about to be invalid, or pose ethical issues. Even
though the clauses may be marginally valid, their efforts may be with
or without their clients' urgings. Other lawyers are not deliberate in
their drafting efforts that "push the line" or include invalid clauses,
but do so "because everyone else does it" or because their legal
research is deficient.
These invalid and iffy clauses raise ethical issues, and a few of
them violate the rules of professional responsibility. The core of this
Article focuses on violations of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (MRPC or Model Rules), with small excursions into the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, as well as
ethical, but uncodified, considerations.3 Admittedly, the literature on
professional responsibility and ethics of the legal profession is thin
on "transactional" issues; that is, those that lawyers confront when
they put together transactional relationships. As such, many of the
conclusions in this Article are based on inferences and analogies
from the existing (but thin) literature that applies to transactional
ethics.
My primary expertise is in commercial law rather than in legal
ethics and professional responsibility. This Article is written from
the former perspective, as an invitation to those in the latter field to
do more work on the subject of "drafting on the edge."
I. COMMON TRANSACTIONAL SCENARIOS RAISING ETHICAL ISSUES
During the process of drafting and negotiating terms that
contract out of the UCC (or any other mandatory rule of law), any of
the following scenarios may unfold:
* Scenario One: During contract negotiations, one party
includes a clause (often in a form contract) that is often
used but is invalid. The other party objects to the
clause being included, but the drafting party responds
that "if the clause is not valid, why worry about it?
Why not leave the clause in?" The other party, lacking
bargaining power, acquiesces but does not comply with
the clause.
* Scenario Two: During contract negotiations, one party
3. Some of these violations may also result in legal malpractice, but that is not the focus of
this article.
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includes a clause that is often used but is invalid. The
other party does not know about the invalidity but
objects to the clause as unfair, unnecessary or
undesirable. The drafting party does not disclose the
invalidity and prevails in keeping the clause in. The
other party then complies with the clause, never
learning of its invalidity.
" Scenario Three: During contract negotiations, one
party includes a clause that is often used but is invalid.
The other party does not object to the clause and later
complies with the clause without learning of its
invalidity.
" Scenario Four: During contract negotiations, one party
includes a clause that is often used but has been the
subject of criticism in commentary and has been
invalidated in other jurisdictions. The other party does
not object to the clause and later complies with it
without learning of the arguments against its validity.
* Scenario Five: During contract negotiations, one party
includes a clause that is often used in similar contracts.
After contract formation, a court in that jurisdiction
rules that these clauses are invalid (for instance, that
the term is unconscionable or against public policy).
The drafting party learns of the decision, but the other
party does not and subsequently complies with the
clause.
These scenarios may occur with neither, one, or both parties
represented by attorneys. If neither party has an attorney, and if the
drafted language did not come from a previous attorney-client
relationship, then professional ethics are not implicated, only
personal ethics. More commonly though, the party proposing the
clause at issue is, or has been, represented by counsel who played a
hand in drafting the clause. The focus then shifts to whether the
other party has counsel as well. This variable sometimes affects the
analysis of ethical and professional responsibility considerations.
II. DISCERNING DEFAULT RULES FROM MANDATORY RULES OF LAW
One source of an agreed clause's invalidity is when one or both
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of the parties believe that the term takes the place of a default
provision in the UCC when, in fact, the UCC provision is mandatory.
But how does one discern whether a UCC provision is a mandatory
rule or a default rule?
The UCC defines an "agreement" as the parties' bargain-in-fact
with each other, unencumbered by additions, subtractions, or
modifications that occur by operation of rules of law.' The UCC
defines a "contract" as the parties' agreement, as affected by
mandatory and default rules of law.' These rules of law are from
both within and without the UCC. Examples of rules inside the UCC
include the statute of frauds,6 the parol evidence rule,7 statutes of
limitations,8 implied warranties,9 and rules on how to disclaim
various warranties." Examples of rules outside of the UCC" include
consumer protection laws," various banking statutes and
regulations,13 evidentiary rules that set standards for how to prove
contract provisions and their breach, 4 rules on what constitutes void
title, 5 and the Bankruptcy Code. 6 The distinction between a
mandatory contract provision' 7 and a default contract provision is
4. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(3) (2003). As of August 2006, 21 states and the U.S. Virgin Islands
have adopted revised Article 1. See Posting of Keith A. Rowley to ContractsProf Blog, Revised
Article 1 Legislative Roundup, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/2006/08/
revised article.html (Aug. 23, 2006); NEIL COHEN, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, MINUTES OF PEB MEETING (Nov. 11, 2005),
http://nccusl.org/update/minutes/PEB111l05.pdf. This Article's analysis is unaffected by which
version has been adopted in a particular jurisdiction.
5. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12).
6. Id. § 2-201.
7. Id. § 2-202.
8. E.g., id. §§ 2-725, 2A-506, 3-118, 4-111, 5-115, 6-110.
9. E.g.,id. §§2-312,2-314.
10. E.g., id. § 2-316.
11. In fact, two of the amended articles include sections listing some of the outside statutes
that supersede or affect the operation of Article 2. Id. §§ 2-108, 2A-104.
12. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2000).
13. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 4901 (2000).
14. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROP. §§ 213, 222 (1936).
16. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2000).
17. This article uses "provision," not "term," for mandatory and default rules of law when
they affect and therefore become part of the contract, because the UCC defines term as part of an
agreement. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(40) (2003). Because an agreement includes only the bargain of
the parties in fact, and not operative law, a term cannot include a default or a mandatory rule of
law. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(3), (b)(12).
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sometimes delineated by the UCC. Some provisions say "unless
otherwise agreed,"' 18 which is a sure sign that the provision is a
default provision. However, the UCC is candid that not all default
provisions are flagged by this language. 19 Other provisions state
which parts are mandatory and which are not. For instance,
unamended section 2-725 states that the default statute of limitations
for contracts for sale of goods is four years, but the parties can agree
to a shorter statute of limitations, no shorter than one year.
2 0
However, the UCC often does not state whether a rule is mandatory
or a default rule, 21 and the courts have rarely addressed this issue.
The result is a simmering set of controversies about the boundary
lines of contracting out of the UCC. Those controversies are the
focus of this Symposium.
Indeed, similar controversies simmer in non-UCC areas of law
as well. For instance, what are the legal limits on clauses purporting
to grant one or both parties injunctive relief in particular situations?
22
Which non-assignability clauses are invalid, at least in part?23 When
are non-waiver clauses invalid because of the operation of mandatory
rules of law like course of performance and waiver, and what must or
should a lawyer do to avoid misleading a client about the variable
validity of these clauses? 24 The same questions can be asked about
no-oral-modification (NOM) clauses, which often fail because the
parties subsequently waived them (even if there is a non-waiver
clause).25  Other terms teeter on the edge of invalidity or
unenforceability because they create unfair trade practices or
deceptive business practices. For instance, a settlement agreement
with a state attorney general invalidated a company's penalty clause
in an online rebate contract because the terms of the rebate and
penalty were buried in three to four layers of hyperlinks.26 In another
18. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-326, 2-327, 2-401(2) (2003).
19. See U.C.C. § 1-102(4) (2000) (amended 2003); U.C.C. § 1-302(c) (2003).
20. U.C.C. § 2-725 (2000).
21. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-201, 4-111.
22. See, e.g., Christina L. Kunz, Teaching First-Year Contracts Students How to Read and
Edit Contract Clauses, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 709 & n.35 (2003).
23. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.4, at 694-95 (4th
ed. 2004).
24. See, e.g., Kunz, supra note 22, at 710 & nn.37-40.
25. See, e.g., id. at 711-12 & nn.44-47.
26. Comp USA Agrees to Discontinue Practice of Placing Disclosures Behind Several Links,
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example, a settlement agreement with a state attorney general
invalidated an online vendor's attempted modification because the
modification was inconspicuous and contradictory, and therefore, a
deceptive business practice.27
These controversies about clause validity sometimes surface in
contract negotiations or in memos from counsel to client about how
to push the line on contracting out of seemingly mandatory rules.
Sometimes the drafting party holds an honest belief that the clause is
valid, while that party's counsel knows that the clause is invalid or
knows that its validity is in controversy. In that situation, the law
imputes counsel's knowledge to their client, the principal, in
determining whether a third person (the other party) has been
defrauded or otherwise disadvantaged under the MRPC.2" In other
situations, the drafting party actually knows of the clause's invalidity
or the controversy about its validity and wants to gain the advantage
that such a clause offers. If either the client or the attorney actually
knows that the clause is invalid, then the focus shifts to whether the
other party or its counsel know of the invalidity.29
Sometimes the other party is oblivious to the clause's invalidity,
but its counsel knows or should have known or discovered otherwise,
in which case counsel's knowledge is imputed to that party" (and the
issue may become one of possible malpractice between attorney and
client). If the other party is not represented by counsel, then the
variable of counsel's actual or constructive knowledge is not present.
Then it is far easier for the other party to be defrauded3 or otherwise
disadvantaged under the MRPC, unless the other party actually knew
of the clause's invalidity before relying on the clause or the drafting
party's representation about the clause's validity (because the other
party, not the drafting party, caused the harm).
6 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. (BNA) 562 (May 30, 2001), discussed in Christina L. Kunz et al.,
Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS.
LAW. 279, 282 n.15 (2003).
27. See In re Juno Online Servs., Inc., Assurance of Discontinuance, N.Y. Att'y Gen.
Internet Bureau 8-9 (2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/juno-assurance.pdf,
discussed in Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in
Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BuS. LAW. 279, 282 n. 15 (2003).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006).
29. Cf id. cmt. b.
30. See id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 37-38.
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On the other hand, if the clause is valid but pushes the line on a
mandatory rule of law, the drafting party may still have some reasons
for concern under the MRPC and other considerations of legal ethics.
The next part of this Article sets out the portions of the MRPC that
pertain to these scenarios and raise those ethical concerns.
III. APPLYING THE PRIME TOOLS FROM THE MRPC
A. MRPC Rule 1.2(d)
Rule 1.2 deals with the scope of representation and the
allocation of authority between client and lawyer.32 Paragraph (d) of
the rule states, "A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal33 or
fraudulent....""
The MRPC does not define "counsel" or "assist,"35 but Ronald
D. Rotunda and John S. Dzienkowski have paraphrased the words as
meaning
that the lawyer cannot advise (urge, suggest, propose,
counsel, exhort) the client to break the law. If the client has
no privilege to engage in certain conduct, lawyers have no
privilege to assist the client to engage in that conduct. The
lawyer is an agent of the client, and ... an agent has no
defense in committing a tort simply because he was acting
under orders of the principal.36
Rule 1.0(d) defines fraud as "conduct that is fraudulent under
the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and
has a purpose to deceive."37  However, "merely negligent
misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2006).
33. A variety of crimes may occur in the course of drafting and negotiating contracts. For a
discussion of criminal offenses involved in transactional ethics violations, see infra Part II.B.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). The rule continues: "[Blut a lawyer may
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel
or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law." Id.
35. See id. R. 1.0.
36. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS-THE LAWYER'S
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 107-08 (A.B.A. Ctr. For Prof 1 Responsibility
ed., 2006-07).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d).
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information" does not constitute fraudulent conduct.3" Thus, if a
drafting party includes an invalid clause to gain a tactical advantage,
it will be fraudulent only if the drafting party or its counsel meant to
deceive the other party.39 A lawyer who drafts or negotiates a clause
designed to make inroads into a mandatory rule of law likely will not
violate Rule 1.2 unless some deception attends the negotiation of that
clause. 4' The same is true of a clause in controversy, but not yet
adjudicated as invalid in a particular jurisdiction.4'
According to an ABA Formal Opinion, a lawyer representing a
client may advise the client of
positions most favorable to the client if the lawyer has a
good-faith belief that such positions are warranted in
existing law or can be supported by a good-faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law... [;] a good-faith belief can exist even if the lawyer
believes the position will not prevail ... [;] good faith
requires some realistic possibility of success.42
If a lawyer drafts a clause of doubtful validity, the lawyer's good-
faith belief in the clause's chances for success becomes relevant
under this Opinion.
A lawyer should not undertake representation without inquiring
further into whether the facts presented by the prospective client
suggest that the lawyer might be aiding the client in perpetrating
fraud.43 During the representation, a lawyer who "present[s] an
38. Id. R. 1.0 cmt. 5.
39. See id. R. 1.0 (d); see, e.g., In re Rausch, 32 P.3d 1181, 1195-96 (Kan. 2001) (lawyer
suspended for two years because of misdemeanor conviction for deceptive business practice, civil
judgment for common law fraud, and various abuses of own trust account, assisting in client's
fraudulent scheme); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 36, at 111-12 n.21 (citing
McElhanon v. Hing, 728 P.2d 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other
grounds, 728 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1986) (lawyer not privileged against liability for assisting client by
drafting document to execute transfer in fraud ofjudgment creditor when lawyer had knowledge
of facts and intent to defraud); Faison v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 839 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 823 (1988) (lawyer liable for helping clients make fraudulent and
unlawful loan by making and helping arrange misrepresentations)); see also infra note 73.
40. See Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 380
(2002); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d), 1.1, 1.2(d), 4.1 (b).
41. Carrington, supra note 40, at 384.
42. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 annots. at 40 (2003) (Subsection (d):
Counseling or Assisting in Unlawful or Fraudulent Conduct) (citing ABA Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (discussing lawyer's preparation of tax
return)).
43. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 (1981)
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analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct" is not necessarily a
party to the client's fraudulent or criminal conduct if the lawyer does
not also "recommend[] the means by which a crime or fraud might
be committed with impunity" 44 or engage in other affirmative
conduct, such as "assisting the client.., by drafting or delivering
documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting
how the wrongdoing might be concealed. '45  Thus, Rule 1.2 is
violated when a lawyer suggests burying or actually buries an invalid
provision in a contract (perhaps using obscure language or an
unobvious location) or forwards a contract draft to the other party
while aware that the draft contains this kind of concealment.
A comment to Rule 1.2 states:
A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct
that the lawyer originally supposed was legally proper but
then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. The lawyer must,
therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in
the matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal
alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the
lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to
disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like.
See Rule 4.1.46
If the "client insists" on "pursuing an objective" that is not
illegal but that "the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," Rule
1.16(b)(3) allows (but does not require) the lawyer to withdraw from
further representation. 7 Particularly in situations where the other
party is not represented by counsel, the lawyer for the drafting party
may become morally uncomfortable with clauses that violate or
abrogate what the lawyer thinks are mandatory rules. In such a
setting, Rule 1.16 allows the lawyer to withdraw from representing
(stating a lawyer should not undertake representation without making further inquiry if facts
presented by prospective client suggest representation might aid client in perpetrating fraud or
otherwise committing a crime)); see, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding a lawyer is liable under federal securities laws for providing an opinion letter
based on facts that the lawyer knows are false, even if the letter explicitly states that the lawyer
was basing his opinion on an assumed set of facts that the client had supplied and that the lawyer
had conducted no independent investigation).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 9.
45. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 10.
46. Id.
47. See id. R. 1.16(b)(3).
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the client.4"
Geoffrey C. Hazard and W. William Hodes include an
illustration in The Law of Lawyering that resembles some of the
scenarios in this Article:
The highest court of State recently held that a certain
clause in a consumer goods contract is unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable. A retail store in State nevertheless
insists that its lawyer, L, continue to include the clause in
its contracts, on the grounds that the great majority of
consumers will not know it is unenforceable and thus will
comply with its terms anyway.49
The authors continue with the following commentary:
The Proposed Final Draft of Rule 1.2(d)... included
language that would have prohibited the preparation of an
instrument "containing terms the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know are legally prohibited." The ABA
House of Delegates deleted this provision, however, before
promulgation of the Model Rules in 1983. The Ethics 2000
Commission... did not recommend restoration of the
deleted text. Given this drafting history, it would seem that
L could not now be disciplined merely for including the
unconscionable clause in the contract.
On the other hand, if the clause is likely to mislead
customers as to their rights, use of the clause might be held
to constitute fraud. If so, the general prohibition in Rule
1.2(d) against assisting in fraud would again be applicable.
L might seek to dissuade his client from including the
clause, bringing to bear moral and other nonlegal concerns,
as contemplated by Rule 2.1.... L might point out, for
example, that continued inclusion of the unconscionable
clause could result in class action liability and adverse
publicity if the practice is challenged in court or criticized
in the media. L might also resign or threaten to resign,
pointing to his right under Rule 1.16(b)(4) to withdraw if
48. Id. R. 1.16(b)(7) cmt. 7 (2006).
49. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 5.12, illus.
5-13 (3d ed. 2001-2005) (Including an Unconscionable Clause in a Contract); see supra text
accompanying notes 36-37.
496
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the client "insists upon pursuing an objective that the
lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.... ." Most clients would treat
seriously the views of a trusted counselor who was willing
to resign over a matter of principle."
A later section of this Article revisits the latter point in its analysis of
Rule 2.1. "
Paul D. Carrington takes an even stronger position in writing
about "unconscionable lawyers."52  He is strongly critical of the
"raging epidemic of provisions in standard form contracts purporting
to strip the party on whom they are imposed of needed procedural
rights."53  His article focuses primarily on arbitration clauses and
their accompanying "bells and whistles," i.e., clauses that apply only
to the other party, location of arbitration favorable to the drafting
party, the drafting party's right to select the arbitrator, the other
party's inability to require the arbitrator to be a knowledgeable
lawyer, the other party's duty to pay some arbitral costs not present
in litigation, bars against claim aggregation and class actions, shorter
statutes of limitations, caps on damages, exclusion of punitive
damages, and deprivation of the other party's statutory right to
attorney fees. 4 However, his conclusions apply to a much wider
collection of clauses, including some of the clauses examined in this
Symposium.
Carrington first examines the rules of law regulating adhesion
contracts in the areas of insurance, franchises, consumer goods,
employment, contracts, carriers, and predatory businesses.5  He
makes the point that "[i]f a predatory business can exempt itself from
the enforcement of these laws by imposing disabling contract
50. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 5.12, illus. 5-13.
51. See infra Part III.C.
52. Carrington, supra note 40, at 361.
53. Id. at 363.
54. See id. at 374-79. Indeed, in Comb v. PayPal, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002),
the court struck down the PayPal arbitration clause as both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, based on some of the "bells and whistles" mentioned in Carrington's article. Id.
at 1173, 1177. The court did not, however, mention any ethical issues. After Comb, though,
especially in the Northern District of California, one wonders about the ethical obligation of
counsel to warn clients about the possible invalidity of consumer contracts containing these
relatively common clauses, based on Model Rule 1.1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.1 (2006) (establishing a lawyer's duty of competent representation).
55. Carrington, supra note 40, at 366-70.
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provisions on all the private attorneys general on whom we rely, our
substantive regulatory laws will have been pro tanto repealed. Such
a business would have achieved self-deregulation."56 He then argues
that lawyers who serve clients with the economic power "to self-
deregulate by gaining control of dispute resolution procedures
through the terms of standard form contracts"57 have countervailing
professional responsibilities. 8 He theorizes that
[t]he ethical problem begins with the impulse of lawyers to
think of the drafting of form contracts as an adversarial
activity in disregard of any consideration of the rights of the
other parties to the contracts who may be illiterate,
ignorant, disabled, inattentive, improvident, or just too
weak to protect their interests, and almost certainly will not
be advised by counsel at the moment when they receive the
form. There being no real adversary, the conditions
justifying the adversarial tradition are absent. 9
Carrington notes that the MRPC contains no explicit provisions
on disciplining such lawyers and that a stronger provision drafted by
the Kutak Commission has been rejected.6" The proposed provision
(noted above in Hazard and Hodes' commentary about the
unconscionable lawyer hypothetical6") would have prohibited "a
lawyer [from] assisting a client to conclude an agreement 'that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal, contains legally
prohibited terms, would work a fraud, or would be held to be
unconscionable as a matter of law."' 62  Although Carrington
theorizes that the reason for the rejection of this provision may have
been because it was "too indeterminate ... for quasi-criminal
professional discipline,"63 another possible reason is the long-
standing debate among practitioners as to the zealousness of lawyers'
advocacy on behalf of clients. Carrington mentions, on one side,
56. Id. at 369-70.
57. Id. at 370.
58. See id. at 379-84.
59. Id. at 370.
60. Id. at 380.
61. See supra text accompanying note 50.
62. Carrington, supra note 40, at 380 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3
(Discussion Draft 1980)).
63. Id. at 380.
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Henry Brougham, David Dudley Field, and Moorfield Storey, and on
the other side, George Wythe, David Hoffman, Louis Brandeis, and
others;' but, of course, the current legal literature is replete with the
same debate in more contemporary terms.65 Carrington realizes these
practical debates mean that disciplinary sanctions are only a remote
possibility against lawyers who merely "assist their clients in abusing
their economic power"66 without violating Rule 1.2 or Rule 8.4.67
B. Rule 8.4
Rule 8.4 makes it
professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so,
or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects; [or] (c) engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ....
Part (c) "encompasses conduct toward clients, tribunals, parties,
witnesses, opposing counsel, and everyone else, both within and
outside the realm of the practice of law. It covers the act of failing to
disclose, as well as affirmatively lying .... Neither damages nor
detrimental reliance is a necessary element .... ,,69  As in Rule 1.2,
64. Id. at 380-83.
65. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 120 & 122.
66. Carrington, supra note 40, at 384.
67. See id. at 379-84.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)-(c) (2006). The remaining portions of
Rule 8.4 usually do not pertain to the scenarios discussed in this Article. Rule 8.4(d), which
forbids "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice," has almost always been
applied to court cases, agency proceedings, and other aspects of dispute resolution. The ABA
annotations for Rule 8.4(d) cite a case involving a lawyer's misrepresentation to an insurer in a
real estate purchase. In re Bruner, 469 S.E.2d 55, 56 n.1 (S.C. 1996), cited in ANN. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 617 (2003) (Subsection (d): Conduct Prejudicial to
the Administration of Justice) (finding Respondent engaged in fraud, dishonesty, and deceit under
both the South Carolina Rules of Professional Practice and Rule 8.4(d)). That case, however,
should instead appear in the annotations for Rule 8.4(c) because South Carolina's Rule 8.4(d) is
identical to MRPC 8.4(c). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 407 R. 8.4 (1976), with MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c).
69. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 608 (Subsection (c):
Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation).
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"fraud" is defined in Rule 1.0(d) and includes scienter. ° Dishonesty
that is not fraudulent is also within Rule 8.4(c).7' A lawyer violates
Rule 8.4(c) by drafting an invalid clause and deceiving a client into
thinking that it is valid, or by representing to a client that the clause
is completely valid when the lawyer knows that the clause is iffy.
72
Other violations occur when a lawyer makes the same kind of
misrepresentations to the other party or its counsel, or to other non-
clients.73 Yet another violation occurs when the lawyer talks the
client into misrepresenting the clause's validity to the other party or
even a third person. Hazard and Hodes note that Rule 8.4(c) lacks a
"materiality" limitation but that "courts and disciplinary
authorities.., generally have given it a sensible reading that forgives
truly trivial deceptions and misrepresentations. 74
"The same conduct that violates Rule 8.4(c) ... also violates
Rule 8.4(b) if the conduct constitutes a crime." 5 For instance, a
lawyer convicted of a misdemeanor for deceptive business practices,
possibly for deceptive contract drafting, might be disciplined under
Rule 8.4(b). 76  "A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(d), (f).
71. Id. R. 8.4(c).
72. See, e.g., ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 609, 612
(Subsection (c): Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) (citing In re Brown, 2001-2863,
pp. 1, 2, 6 (La. 3/22/02); 813 So. 2d 325, 326, 328 (lawyer deceived clients as to paralegal
working as a lawyer); In re Wahlder, 98-2742, pp. 1, 2 (La. 1/15/99); 728 So. 2d 837, 838
(lawyer falsified documents by letting client sign wife's name to document and then told law
office employee to notarize the signature); In re Frost, 793 A.2d 699, 705, 706-07 (N.J. 2002)
(lawyer entered into "patently unfair" loan agreement with client and made misrepresentations to
client)).
73. See, e.g., id. R. 8.4 annots. at 611-12 (Subsection (c): Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or
Misrepresentation) (citing In re Disciplinary Action Against Shinnick, 552 N.W.2d 212, 214
(Minn. 1996) (lawyer violated Rule 8.4(c) due to his deceit and fraud in corporate transactions to
which he was a party, officer, or board member, but not counsel); In re Conduct of Gallagher, 26
P.3d 131, 132, 135-36 (Or. 2001) (lawyer had duty to correct known error in settlement checks
made by opposing counsel, rather than "duping" opposing counsel); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'I Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1518 (1986) (lawyer should give notice of inadvertent
omission from contract to prevent unfair advantage to own client because of error), discussed
further in infra text accompanying notes 129-135)).
74. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 65.5.
75. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 605-06 (Subsection (b):
Criminal Conduct); see also ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 36, § 8.4-2(c) (Criminal
Acts).
76. See ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 605-06 (Subsection (b):
Criminal Conduct) (citing In re Rausch, 32 P.3d 1181, 1186, 1188-90, 1196 (Kan. 2001) (lawyer
suspended for two years because of misdemeanor conviction for deceptive business practice, civil
judgment for common law fraud, various abuses of own trust account, and assisting in client's
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significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to
legal obligation."77  The lawyer need not be charged with or
convicted of the crime.78 Possible crimes in a transactional setting
include felonies for bankruptcy fraud,79 fraudulent bidding schemes,"
felony conspiracy to commit tax fraud," and attempted tax evasion.
Rule 8.4 is somewhat redundant with other Model Rules,
including Rule 1.2(d), but is slightly broader in scope. It includes
conduct not specifically connected to the practice of law or a lawyer-
client relationship.83 It encompasses the lawyer's dishonesty, deceit,
and misrepresentation (as well as fraudulent and criminal conduct).84
Rule 8.4(a) extends to all violations, actual and attempted, of the
MRPC, as well as assistance in such violations,85 including
supervision of a lawyer who does the violation.86 "[I]f a supervisory
[sic] lawyer knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an
opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as the
subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension."87
C. Rule 2.1
The comments to Rule 2.1 explain that the client is entitled to
"straightforward, .... candid," and even "unpalatable" advice,
including "unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be
disinclined to confront." 8 This rule also allows insights from other
fields, practical implications, and moral considerations. 9 Although
the rule says that a lawyer rendering advice "may refer ... to other
fraudulent scheme)).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2006).
78. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 annots. at 604 (Subsection (b):
Criminal Conduct).
79. See In re Mcintosh, 991 P.2d 403, 404-05 (Kan. 1999).
80. In re Scott, 2001-1337, pp. 1-2, 7-8 (La. 1/15/02); 805 So. 2d 137, 138, 141-42.
81. Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Seall, 690 N.E.2d 1271, 1271 (Ohio 1998).
82. In re Ellner, 686 N.Y.S.2d 806, 806-07 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
83. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2006), with id R. 1.2(d). See id.
R. 8.4 cmt. 2.
84. Id. R. 8.4(b) cmt. 2.
85. Id. R. 8.4(a).
86. Id. R. 5.1 (c)(2).
87. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 36, § 8.4-2(b), at 1187 (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 5).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
89. Id. R. 2.1 & cmts. 2 & 4.
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considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation,"90 some cases are so
infused with nonlegal considerations that a lawyer has a duty to raise
these considerations, lest the lawyer's advice become inadequate and
thereby violate Rule 1.1 as to competence or Rule 1.4 as to a
lawyer's communication.9'
Occasionally, a court rules that the optional discourse in Rule
2.1 is mandatory in some circumstances. In In re Marriage of
Foran,92 the Washington Court of Appeals refused to enforce a
prenuptial contract that was "economically unfair" (because it was
steeply slanted to the future husband's interests) and was not
"voluntarily and intelligently" entered into (because the wife-to-be
was not represented by counsel and had been subject to domestic
violence before the marriage).93 The court stated that
[a]n attorney who represents either party to a prenuptial
contract should seriously consider the implications of RPC
2.1 ([as to] moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation[]). A client is
not well served by an unenforceable contract. Marital
tranquility is not achieved by a contract which is
economically unfair or achieved by unfair means.94
Indeed, cases such as Foran pose additional ethical issues
90. Id. R. 2.1 (emphasis added).
91. See id. R. 1.1, 1.4, 2.1; HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 23.3, at 23-24. The authors
noted that:
lawyers frequently are put into a position where they must help a client attain
something that the lawyer-if not "in role"--would disapprove, while the lawyer tries
to maintain a sense of his or her own rectitude and moral autonomy.
One way out of this dilemma is for the lawyer to take advantage of the opportunity
provided by Rule 2.1 and Restatement §94(3) to engage the client in frank discussion
about the very factors that give the lawyer pause-a moral dialog between autonomous
individuals. The point of this exercise is not only to provide the client with more
insight into the overall ramifications of a decision that is at hand. The additional point
is that such a dialog permits the lawyer to exercise moral autonomy by attempting to
dissuade the client from a particular course of action on overtly non-legal grounds.
The client, of course, may in turn exercise autonomy by rejecting this advice, and
directing the lawyer to continue the representation as originally contemplated-always
assuming that both the ends and the means are still lawful.
Id. § 23.4.
92. 834 P.2d 1081 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
93. See id. at 1086-87, 1090 & n.17.
94. Id. at 1089n.14.
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beyond Rule 2.1. Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to "provide competent
representation to a client."95  Comment 2 to Rule 1.1 mentions
"[s]ome important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent...
and legal drafting, [that] are required in all legal problems. 96 If a
lawyer drafts a contract so favorable to the client that the lawyer
risks invalidating all or part of the contract, Rule 1.1 arguably
dictates that the lawyer analyze the precedent to discern the risk of
invalidity, then either redraft accordingly or advise the client of that
risk. " This allows the client to assess the risk and potential
consequences of invalidation to decide whether to assume that risk.
Recall that in Hazard and Hodes' illustration concerning a
lawyer who drafts an unconscionable contract clause, quoted earlier
as to Rule 1.2,98 the commentators noted that
L might seek to dissuade his client from including the
clause, bringing to bear moral and other nonlegal concerns,
as contemplated by Rule 2.1.... L might point out, for
example, that continued inclusion of the unconscionable
clause could result in class action liability and adverse
publicity if the practice is challenged in court or criticized
in the media.99
Rule 2.1 plays an especially valuable role as to clauses that
attempt to contract out of mandatory rules of law or dance on the
edge of invalidity. Moral, economic, social, and political
considerations are often the best arguments against including invalid
clauses even when the drafting party represents them as harmless.' 0
As to clauses that only the drafting party or attorney knows are
invalid, Rule 2.1 mandates that the lawyer give the client "candid"
and even "unpalatable advice," without soft-pedaling the bad news
that a particular clause is not valid.'' If a particular clause is iffy
because it has been criticized or even struck down in another
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
96. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
97. See id. R. 1.1 & cmts. 2 & 5.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
99. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 5.12, illus. 5-13, at 5-40 (Including an
Unconscionable Clause in a Contract).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 & cmt. 1; see supra Part I (Scenario One).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 & cmt. 1; supra Part I (Scenarios Two
and Three).
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jurisdiction,' the client needs to hear and consider the possibility of
mandatory precedent against the clause during or after the life of the
contract. The lawyer should seriously consider urging the client to
consider practicalities, such as how a clause that later becomes
invalid will affect the parties' relationship, performance on both
sides, public perceptions, other contracts with the same language,
and other concurrent negotiations.
D. Rule 4.1 (a)
Rule 4.1(a) states, "In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly: °3 (a) make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent1 "4 act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.""' The "third persons" covered by this rule include "opponents,
witnesses, opposing counsel, and court personnel.' ' 6  Comment 1
states that "[m]isrepresentations can ... occur by partially true but
misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of
affirmative false statements."'0 7 Although Comment 1 states that "[a]
lawyer.., generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing
party of relevant facts," the Comment has been amended to include a
102. See supra Part I (Scenarios Four and Five).
103. "Knowingly" means "actual knowledge of the fact in question," which may be "inferred
from [the] circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f). The Second Circuit
held a lawyer liable for fraud for his misrepresentation of the client's insurance coverage during
settlement negotiations, when a document in the lawyer's possession said otherwise. The court
found that the lawyer had sufficient scienter under New York law because of his "'reckless
indifference to error,"' his "'pretense of exact knowledge,"' or his "assertion of a false material
fact 'susceptible of accurate knowledge' but stated to be true on the personal knowledge of the
representer." Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co. of N.Y., 614 F.2d 301, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting
Burgundy Basin Inn v. Watkins Glen Grand Prix, 379 N.Y.S.2d 873, 879 (App. Div. 1976)). The
lawyer was later disciplined for this misrepresentation and other errors. In re McGrath, 468
N.Y.S.2d 349, 351-52 (App. Div. 1983).
104. For the definition of "fraudulent," see supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1. The Rules do not define "material." For
analysis of the versions of Rule 1.6, see ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 36, § 4.1-3(b),
(c), at 819-22.
106. ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 annots. at 412 (2003) (Subsection (a):
Making False Statements to Third Persons). In some respects, Rule 4.1(b) is a close cousin to
Rule 3.3(a)(3), counsel's duty of candor to the court, including the duty to disclose adverse
precedent. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3); see HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 5.2, at 5-6. See generally
Christopher W. Deering, Candor Toward the Tribunal: Should an Attorney Sacrifice Truth and
Integrity for the Sake of the Client?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 59 (1997).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
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cross-reference to Rule 8.4,"°8 which forbids a lawyer from
"engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation."'
0 9
Section 98 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers closely resembles Rule 4.1(b). It states, "[A] lawyer
communicating on behalf of a client with a nonclient may not.., fail
to make a disclosure of information required by law"" in litigative
as well as non-litigative situations, whether made to a lawyer or a
nonlawyer."'
Hazard and Hodes summarize Rule 4. 1(a) as standing for the
uncontroversial proposition that "although lawyers are supposed to
be zealous partisans of their clients, they must draw the line at lying
[materially].... Rule 4.1 (b), on the other hand, is more controversial
[in] establishing the proper response for a lawyer faced with
client fraud in which the lawyer's services may have been used.""' 2
If a client wishes its lawyer to "make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person" in violation of Rule 4.1(a), 3
the lawyer can merely refuse to make such a statement. However, if
a client wishes its lawyer to "fail to disclose a material fact when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client," and if the disclosure is a client confidentiality protected
by Rule 1.6,"' then the lawyer (if he or she cannot change the client's
mind) must withdraw from representation (under Rule 1.16) to avoid
violating Rule 1.2's prohibition against helping the client engage in
criminal or fraudulent conduct."5 In some situations, the lawyer may
also need to notify the other party or its lawyer that it has ceased to
represent the drafting party." 6
If documents, which contain falsehoods, have been given to
108. Id.
109. Id. R. 8.4(c).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 (2000)
111. Id. § 98 cmts. (a) & (b).
112. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 37.2, at 37-3 (emphasis omitted). They note that
Rule 3.3(a) forbids "all false statements of fact [not just material ones] made to a tribunal by a
lawyer .... Whether the ... more relaxed standard for out-of-court statements is appropriate
remains a matter of some debate." Id. § 37.3, at 37-6, 37-7.
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2006).
114. Id. R. 4. l(b); see supra note 105 as to versions of Rule 1.6.
115. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 36, § 4.1-3(a), at 817-18.
116. Id. at819.
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the opposing party, the lawyer will probably need to
disaffirm them even though this signals implicitly that a
problem exists with those documents. Whether a lawyer
may [or must] go further and disclose information about the
crime or fraud, depends upon the state's version of Rule
1.6.117
Another tricky situation for a lawyer is when a lawyer is
questioned closely by a third party,
and a truthful answer will hurt the lawyer's client. Rule
4. 1(a) provides that a lawyer may not lie if the matter is
material; she may only refuse to answer, evade answering,
or request an opportunity to consult with her client. Of
course hedging may alert the other party to be on further
inquiry, and often it will have the same detrimental effect as
a truthful answer .... [L]awyers and other negotiators can
develop tactics to parry direct inquiries, such as hedging all
their answers, so that further hedging will not
unintentionally signal the truth."'
Comment 2 notes that
[u]nder generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value
placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are
ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an
undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the
principal would constitute fraud.119
117. Id.
118. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, § 37.3, at 37-7, 37-8. In response to a factual
situation about a lawyer who is asked just such a probing question by the other party during a
negotiation, the authors analyze the alternatives of making a limited answer, engaging in
speculation, remaining silent, and otherwise evading the question. Id. illus. 37-1, at 37-9, 37-10
(Making Misleading Statements During a Negotiation).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2. Similarly, the Third Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers says that "[c]ertain statements, such as some statements relating to
price or value, are considered nonactionable hyperbole or a reflection of the state of mind of the
speaker and not misstatements of fact or law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 98 cmt. c (2000). The comment goes on to list tests and factors used to judge
whether a statement is a representation of puffing. Id. For the factors considered in determining
whether a statement is puffing, see generally CAROL L. CHOMSKY & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SALE
OF GOODS: READING AND APPLYING THE CODE 131-35 (2d ed. 2004).
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The original version of this comment generated considerable
responses from commentators on lawyering styles, negotiation
ethics, and settlement agreements. 2 ' The comment was amended in
2002 to add the word "ordinarily" before the two examples
mentioned above,' 21 but the debate rages on as to the adequacy of that
response and the underlying issues.
122
Indeed, the propriety of-and even the need for-"puffing" and
disingenuity in negotiation is a long-standing topic of disagreement
among commentators.' 23 One view is that
negotiation interactions involve a deceptive process in
which a certain amount of "puffing" and "embellishment"
is expected, as the participants attempt to convince their
opponents that they must obtain better terms than they must
120. See, e.g., ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 annots. at 414 (2003)
(Subsection (a): Making False Statements to Third Persons) (citing Robert P. Burns, Some Ethical
Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 696 (2001) (minimalist approach of
Rule 4.1 "in imposing obligation[] of truthfulness is [due to] moral ambiguity of truthfulness as
an ideal in the context of share bargaining" and difficulties of enforcing truth-telling rule in
"community of two."); Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics: How to be Deceptive Without
Being Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713, 715
(1997) ("[T]he fundamental question is not whether legal negotiators may use misrepresentations
to further client interests, but when and about what they may permissibly dissemble."); Michael
G. Daigneault & Jack Marshall, A House Divided, 44 FED. LAW, May 1997, 18, at 18, 19
(discussing flaws in Rule 4.1, and need for legal community to address negotiation ethics; "[w]hat
is permissible versus impermissible in negotiation appears largely to be a matter of opinion,
semantics, and circumstance[]"); Mary Jo Eyster, Clinical Teaching, Ethical Negotiation, and
Moral Judgment, 75 NEB. L. REV. 752, 757-59, 800-01 (1996) (explaining that although the
"negotiation process lends itself to ... unscrupulous conduct," legal scholars do not agree upon
what practices should be prohibited; reform must come by educating lawyers to engage in "sound
moral reasoning"); Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems
of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 94 (2002) (taking issue with
implication in Rule 4.1 and Comment that "barring all types of misrepresentation would demand
too much"); Paul Rosenberger, Laissez- "Fair": An Argument for the Status Quo Ethical
Constraints on Lawyers as Negotiators, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 611, 638 (1998) (stating
that "further good faith and fair dealing" requirements for negotiations would be "unworkable and
create more problems than [it w]ould solve.")).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
122. See, e.g., Van M. Pounds, Promoting Truthfulness in Negotiation: A Mindful Approach,
40 WILLIAMETrE L. REV. 181, 192-98 (2004) (citing John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use
and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 97 (1997)); Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big
Quake: The Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1089, 1114-15 (2006).
123. See sources cited supra note 120; Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-
Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1388, 1391-95 (1986). See generally Alvin B. Rubin, A
Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 580-83 (1975); James J. White,
Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 926, 927-28 (1980).
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actually achieve .... '[N]o one tells the truth all of the
time, nor is perpetual truth telling expected in most
circumstances .... Thus, a person considered trustworthy
and a truth teller actually is a person who tells the truth at
the right or necessary time." 1
2 4
An opposing view is that Rule 4.1 is "insufficient and ineffective";125
a better set of rules would be the five principles from A Negotiation
Ethics Primer for Lawyers:2 (1) a lawyer must obey substantive
laws and advise a client to do so; (2) "a lawyer must not make
material misrepresentations, conceal material facts, or advise or
assist a client in doing so"; (3) a lawyer must avoid another's
detrimental reliance by correcting errors or misunderstandings
generated by the lawyer or the client (or must resign); (4) the rules
should encourage discussion of "moral or ethical consequences of a
proposed course of action ... with a client"; and (5) the rules must
allow a lawyer to refuse to comply with client conduct that the
lawyer thinks is unlawful or dishonest.
12 7
Rule 4.1 is often applied to a particular kind of contract
negotiations-the negotiation of a settlement agreement. 128  In this
setting, both parties are represented by counsel, and the party most
likely to prevail at trial usually has greater bargaining power.
In 1986, the ABA issued an informal opinion on the ethical duty
of a lawyer who has discovered that an agreed clause unfavorable to
his or her client has been inadvertently omitted from the final signed
version of the agreement. 129  The conclusion was that the lawyer
should contact the other party's lawyer to correct the error and need
124. Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450 n.14 (D. Md. 2002) (setting
a four-part test for determining violations of Rule 4.1(a)(1) by attorney during settlement
negotiations and to court clerk) (quoting Craver, supra note 120, at 716).
125. See Daigneault & Marshall, supra note 120, at 20.
126. Id. (citing Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, A Negotiation Ethics Primer for
Lawyers, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 549, 551 (1996)).
127. Id.
128. See Ausherman, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 446 ("[C]ertain aspects of [negotiation] unavoidably
involve statements that are less than completely accurate, such as posturing or puffery, intentional
vagueness regarding a negotiating party's 'bottom line,' estimates of price or value, and the
party's ultimate intentions regarding what an acceptable settlement would be-all of which are
thought to encompass representations that are not 'material.'").
129. The opinion did not "reach the issue of the lawyer's duty if the client wishes to exploit
the error." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1518 n.1 (1986)
(notice to opposing counsel of inadvertent omission of contract provision).
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not contact his or her client about the error. 30 The ABA committee
reasoned that the scrivener's error occurred after the parties had
agreed to the clause, so the self-executing remedy is reformation. 3'
Rule 1.4 does not apply because the client has already made the
decision and told the lawyer of that decision. 3 ' Rule 1.2's comment
allows a lawyer to "decide the 'technical' means to be employed to
carry out the objective of the representation, without consultation
with the client."'33  The client has a right to "committed and
dedicated representation" under Rule 1.2 but does not have a right to
insist that its lawyer "capitalize on the clerical error."' 34 Rule 1.2(d)
forbids a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client to engage in
fraudulent conduct; Rule 4.1(b) mandates a lawyer's disclosure of a
material fact to a third person when necessary to prevent assisting the
client in fraud; and Rule 8.4(c) bars a lawyer's conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.'35
Taken together, this latter trio of rules weighs in favor of a
lawyer's disclosure that he or she knows that a proposed clause is
invalid, regardless of whether the other party or its lawyer knows of
the invalidity, unless Rule 1.6's protection of client confidences
outweighs those rules.'36  Although the ABA opinion in the
preceding paragraph does not address the situation in which the
client wishes to exploit the error, this same trio of rules weighs in
favor of a lawyer refusing to assist a client in misrepresenting the
validity of a proposed clause. A tougher question is whether the
same obligation exists when the clause is rendered invalid-perhaps
on the basis of unconscionability or public policy 37-- by a ruling in
an unrelated case, after the contract is formed but before the other
party performs on the clause to his or her detriment. If the drafting
party's lawyer expressly or impliedly represented the validity of the
130. ABA Comm. On Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 86-1518 (1986).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Although the opinion uses Rule 4.1(b), determining the validity of a contract clause
involves application of law to facts, not just failure to disclose a fact, so it is arguably instead
governed by Rule 4. 1(a).
136. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 49, illus. 5-13. illus. 37-1, illus. 37-3.
137. This situation involves a clause invalidated by unconscionability or public policy, rather
than by a new rule of law that is to be applied in a prospective fashion only.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:487
clause during negotiations leading up to contract formation, the
representation was not fraudulent or dishonest or a misrepresentation
at that time. If the other party, however, reasonably relies on the
drafting lawyer's original representation to its detriment by perform-
ing its obligations under the contract, some jurisdictions might hold
this to be an implied continuing fraud or misrepresentation by the
lawyer. It would also be dishonest conduct (allowing a client to take
advantage of the clause's benefit to which it is not entitled), which
Rule 8.4 forbids. If the other party were to discover the invalidity, it
usually would be entitled to recover the benefit given to the drafting
party based on the principles of unjust enrichment.138
IV. CONCLUSION
The theme of this Symposium is how much lawyers can bend
the boundaries of mandatory rules of law or even invade the heart of
these mandatory rules, by "contracting out" of the UCC. This
Article has examined the ethical pressures and proscriptions on
lawyers in these situations and other situations where the clauses
being drafted are of dubious or certain invalidity. Rules 1.2, 4.1, and
8.4 provide a powerful set of proscriptions against lawyers who
intentionally draft or negotiate invalid clauses, fail to advise a client
of an invalid or iffy clause, or misrepresent the validity of a clause to
a client or another party or person. Rule 2.1 furnishes some
compelling reasons why lawyers should counsel their clients more
broadly than on legal con-siderations alone. These rules, however,
do not prevent a lawyer from skillfully drafting a clause that is "close
to the edge, but not over," as long as the lawyer has a good-faith
argument as to the clause's validity, supported by a good-faith belief.
In many situations, a candid dialog between lawyer and client
will resolve the ethical tension generated by an invalid or iffy clause,
but in some situations, the lawyer has an obligation to disclose some
facts to the other party, redraft the clause, or withdraw from repre-
senting the client. In other situations, the client's entitlement to zeal-
ous representation and client confidences takes precedence.
Lawyers tend to re-use and redraft contract language, both in
standard-form agreements and in negotiated agreements. The re-
sulting clauses tend to benefit their clients more and more, as the
138. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) (Promise for Benefit
Received).
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clauses approach the bounds of validity and concurrently raise more
of the ethical issues discussed in this Article. Some of the lawyers
who draft iffy or invalid clauses are seeking to contract out of UCC
rules, despite good arguments that some of those rules are mandatory
or that the new clause attempts to disclaim "the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care." 139 This Article invites
practicing lawyers, judges, and ethics scholars to look more closely
at transactional ethics, in order to (1) enhance the legal profession's
awareness of ethical pitfalls in "too-sharp" drafting practices,
(2) bring ethics rules to bear on existing drafting practices that
violate the rules, and (3) further develop transactional ethics into a
more robust field that is better able to curb the ethical abuses in
drafting and negotiation discussed in this Article.
139. U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2003).
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